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Beyond Judicial Minimalism
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
Many judges are minimalists. They favor rulings that are narrow, in the sense
that they govern only the circumstances of the particular case, and also shallow,
in the sense that they do not accept a deep theory of the legal provision at issue.
In law, narrow and shallow decisions have real advantages insofar as they
reduce both decision costs and error costs; make space for democratic
engagement on fundamental questions; and reflect a norm of civic respect. In
many cases, however, minimalism is hard to justify in these ways. Sometimes
small steps increase the aggregate costs of decisions; sometimes they produce
large errors, especially when they export decision-making burdens to fallible
people. Predictability is an important variable, and minimalist decisions can
compromise predictability. Sometimes large, nonminalist steps serve democratic
values and do not compromise the norm of civic respect. It follows that the
justifications for minimalism are unconvincing in many contexts. The debate
between minimalists and their adversaries is closely related to the debate between
those who prefer standards and those who prefer rules, though there are some
important differences.
I. The Argument
Many judges prefer to avoid broad rulings and theoretical ambition. My goal here
is to attempt to understand the justifications for this preference and to explore their
limitations. As we shall see, avoidance and modest ambition have an important place in
law. But in some domains, minimalism is a terrible blunder.
To offer a preview of my central claims: Many of the arguments on behalf of
minimalism are essentially pragmatic. For example, minimalists care the costs of decision
and the costs of error. Minimalists believe that their approach will minimize both of these
costs. Minimalists also point to the importance of democratic self-government and a
norm of civic respect. Minimalists believe that by leaving central issues undecided, they
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can maintain ample space for self-governance while also demonstrating respect to people
who disagree on fundamental matters.
In many contexts, however, these arguments fail to provide an adequate defense
of minimalism. Sometimes minimalist rulings increase the costs of decisions and the
costs of errors. If courts take small steps, they will impose serious burdens on others, and
if future decisionmakers (lower courts, administrative agencies) are unreliable,
minimalism might produce many mistakes. Predictability is an important value, and
minimalist rulings make predictability impossible to achieve. Nonminimalist rulings can
increase democratic space, certainly insofar as they give an authoritative signal that
elected officials are permitted to do as they want. By contrast, minimalist decisions
require officials to speculate about what the Court will ultimately do. Civic respect is
unquestionably important, but sometimes the Constitution is properly read to declare
certain practices off-limits. In law, as in ordinary life, the justifications for minimalism
frequently fail, and hence sensible judges sometimes find it necessary to go beyond
minimalism.
II. Minimalisms
A. Shallow and Narrow
When people are confronted with a difficult decision, they often move in the
direction of minimalism. Minimalists prefer modest steps over ambitious ones. This
preference operates along two distinct dimensions.
First, minimalists want to proceed in a way that is shallow rather than deep. In
deciding what to do with a relationship or a medical problem, minimalists want to leave
the foundational issues undecided. They want to decide what to do, today or tomorrow or
next month, without resolving the deepest questions, or without accepting some large
account of how the relationship or the problem should be handled.
Second, minimalists want to proceed in way that is narrow rather than wide.
They want to decide what to do about next month’s vacation, or a current problem in the
workplace, without deciding how to handle many future vacations, or what to do about
problems in the workplace in general. In ordinary life, minimalism, in the form of
shallowness and narrowness, can provide a great deal of help with difficult situations.
Sensible people often take small steps for that reason.
But for those who embrace minimalism, there is an evident problem. Sometimes
shallowness is a bad idea; sometimes it is best to rethink foundational issues.
Occasionally one needs to make a large-scale decision about a medical problem.
Sometimes it is best to settle on a course of action for the workplace and even vacations,
rather than to rest content with a series of small decisions. Minimalism might be easiest
in the short-run, but in the long-run, it can be extremely destructive. It can be destructive
in part because it exports the burdens of decision to one’s future self, in a way that might
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produce a great deal of trouble. However difficult a large decision may be, it may be best
to make it, and sooner rather than later.
To come to terms with minimalism, it is necessary to consider the costs of
decisions and the costs of errors. Minimalist judgments might decrease those costs,
because they reduce the burdens of decisions in particular cases, and because in some
circumstances, they reduce the number and magnitude of errors as well. If people lack
information that would justify confidence in width, narrowness might be much better.
Shallowness might have virtues for the same reason. But we can easily imagine situations
in which both depth and width are preferable. A series of case-by-case decisions, with
respect to the workplace or a course of medical treatment, might increase the burdens of
decision on balance. In addition, such decisions might increase rather than decrease
errors. Sometimes people take large steps, rather than small ones, as a way of simplifying
their decision-making burdens and ensuring that overall errors will be reduced.
In law, minimalism plays an exceedingly important role. Some judges favor
shallow rulings. Such rulings attempt to produce rationales and outcomes on which
diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their disagreement on fundamental issues. For
example, there are vigorous disputes about the underlying purpose of the free speech
guarantee: Should the guarantee be seen as protecting democratic self-government, or the
marketplace of ideas, or individual autonomy? Minimalists hope not to resolve these
disputes. They seek judgments and rulings that can attract shared support from people
who are committed to one or another of these foundational understandings, or who are
unsure about the foundations of the free speech principle.
Minimalist judges also like narrow rulings, which do not venture far beyond the
problem at hand. They attempt to focus on the particulars of the dispute before the Court.
Consider in this light American Chief Justice John Roberts’s suggestion that one
advantage of unanimous decisions from the Court is that unanimity leads to narrower
rulings. In his words, “[t]he broader the agreement among the justices, the more likely it
is a decision on the narrowest possible grounds.”1 The nine justices have highly diverse
views, and if they are able to join a single opinion, that opinion is likely to be narrow
rather than broad. This, in the Chief Justice’s view, is entirely desirable, as he explained
with an aphoristic summary of the pro-narrowness position in constitutional law: “If it is
not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide
more.”
It is important to see that in many domains, including law, shallowness and
narrowness are very different. We could imagine a decision that is shallow but wide.
Consider, for example, the view that racial segregation is always forbidden,
unaccompanied by any deep account of what is wrong with racial segregation. We could
also imagine a decision that is deep but narrow. Consider, for example, a ban on
censorship of a particular political protest, accompanied by a theoretically ambitious
1.Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Commencement Address at the Georgetown University
Law Center (May 21, 2006).
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account of the free speech principle, but limited to the particular situation in which
censorship has been imposed. A decision might be both shallow and narrow or both wide
and deep, but the two distinctions point in different directions.
It should be clear that both distinctions are ones of degree rather than kind. In
most contexts, courts should not decide important cases without giving reasons, and
reasons ensure at least some degree of depth. No one favors rulings that are limited to
people with the same names or initials as those of the litigants before the Court. But
among reasonable alternatives, minimalists show a persistent preference for the shallower
and narrower options, especially in cases at the frontiers of constitutional law. In such
cases, minimalists fear that justices lack relevant information; they do not have a full
sense of the many situations to which a broad rule might apply. Minimalists also fear the
potentially harmful effects of decisions that reach far beyond the case at hand. They
distrust width and depth because they think that judges are often in a poor position to
adopt a theoretically contentious view or to produce a wide rule.
I will return to these points, and to minimalists’ characteristic timidity
(cowardice?) shortly. For the moment let us notice that to defend their approach,
minimalists will seek to argue that shallow, narrow rulings will minimize decision costs
and error costs. By avoiding depth and width, minimalists hope to reduce decisionmaking burdens. Emphasizing what judges do not know, minimalists characteristically
believe that theoretical depth, and width, will produce a great deal of trouble for the
future. Minimalists need not speak only in these terms. They might add that if certain
foundational questions are unresolved, citizens and representatives have room to debate
them, in a way that is valuable for democratic reasons. Consider the scope of the Second
Amendment, the power of the president over the independent regulatory commissions,
the nature of executive privilege. Perhaps it is desirable that these issues remain
unresolved and that participants in politics can debate the constitutional issues without a
clear ruling from the Supreme Court.
As in ordinary life, however, we can imagine circumstances in which minimalism
cannot be defended on the pragmatic grounds that minimalists characteristically invoke.
A series of case-by-case rulings might increase the burden of decision, rather than
diminishing them. And if minimalists avoid width, they might unleash subsequent
decisionmakers in a way that will produce more errors overall. Uncertainty can produce
serious problems for both citizens and representatives. I will return to these objections
below.
B. Hollowness, Shallowness, and Conceptual Descents
It seems clear that people can often agree on constitutional practices, and even on
constitutional rights, when they cannot agree on constitutional theories. In other words,
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well-functioning constitutional orders try to solve problems through incompletely
theorized agreements.2
Sometimes these agreements involve abstractions, accepted as such amidst severe
disagreements on particular cases. We might think of incompletely theorized abstractions
as hollow, in the sense that they must be filled, and have not yet been filled, with some
kind of specification. Thus people who disagree on whether the Constitution should
protect incitement to violence and hate speech can accept a general free speech principle,
and those who disagree about whether the Constitution should protect same-sex
relationships can accept an abstract antidiscrimination principle. This is an important
phenomenon in constitutional law and politics; it makes constitution-making possible.
Constitution-makers can agree on abstractions without agreeing on the particular
meaning of those abstractions.
A pragmatic argument on behalf of hollowness, in the form of incompletely
theorized abstractions, is that nothing else is feasible. Perhaps an effort at specification
will prove too contentious; citizens will support the abstraction but not the specification.
Or perhaps constitution-makers lack the information that would give them reason for
confidence in any specification. If so, the best way to proceed may be to set out a general
norm, and to allow posterity to fill it in as it seems fit. As with small steps, hollowness
may reduce the burdens of decisions while also minimizing errors. If the drafters of a
constitution attempt to specify certain provisions—involving, for example, the power of
the executive branch, or the precise content of an equality principle—they may blunder
badly, especially when circumstances are likely to change over time.
But sometimes incompletely theorized agreements involve concrete outcomes
rather than abstractions. In hard cases, people can often agree that a certain practice is or
is not constitutional, even when the theories that underlie their judgments sharply
diverge. In the day-to-day operation of constitutional practice, shallow rulings help to
ensure a sense of what the law is, even amidst large-scale disagreements about what,
particularly, accounts for those rules and doctrines.
This latter phenomenon suggests a general strategy for handling some of the most
difficult decisions. In ordinary life, we might attempt to bracket the fundamental issues
and decide that however they are best resolved, a particular approach makes sense for the
next month or year. So too in law, politics, and morality. When people disagree or are
uncertain about an abstract issue—is equality more important than liberty? does free will
exist? is utilitarianism right? does punishment have retributive aims?—they can often
make progress by moving to a level of greater particularity. They attempt a conceptual
descent. This phenomenon has an especially notable feature: It enlists silence, on certain
basic questions, as a device for producing convergence despite disagreement, uncertainty,
limits of time and capacity, and heterogeneity. In short, silence can be a constructive
force. Incompletely theorized agreements are an important source of successful
2
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constitutionalism and social stability; they also provide a way for people to demonstrate
mutual respect.
Consider some examples. People may believe that it is important to protect
religious liberty while having quite diverse theories about why this is so. Some people
may stress what they see as the need for social peace; others may think that religious
liberty reflects a principle of equality and a recognition of human dignity; others may
invoke utilitarian considerations; still others may think that religious liberty is itself a
theological command. Similarly, people may invoke many different grounds for their
shared belief that the Constitution should ensure an independent judiciary. Some may
think that judicial independence helps ensure against tyranny; others may think that it
makes government more democratic; still others may think that it leads to greater
efficiency in economic terms.
The agreement on particulars is incompletely theorized in the sense that the
relevant participants are clear on the practice or the result without agreeing on the most
general theory that accounts for it. Often people can agree that a rule—protecting
political dissenters, forbidding government to take private property without paying
compensation—makes sense without entirely agreeing on the foundations of their belief.
They may accept an outcome—affirming the right to marry, protecting sexually explicit
art, banning racial segregation—without understanding or converging on an ultimate
ground for that acceptance. Often people can agree not merely on the outcome, but also
on a rationale offering low-level or mid-level principles on its behalf. But what ultimately
accounts for the outcome, in terms of a full-scale theory of the right or the good, is left
unexplained.
There is an extreme case of incomplete theorization, offered when disagreement
is especially intense: full particularity. This phenomenon occurs when people agree on a
result without agreeing on any kind of supporting rationale. They announce what they
want to do without offering a reason for doing it. Any rationale—any reason—is by
definition more abstract than the result that it supports. Sometimes people do not offer
reasons at all, because they do not know what those reasons are, or because they cannot
agree on reasons, or because they fear that the reasons that they have would turn out, on
reflection, to be inadequate and hence to be misused in the future. Here decisions are
maximally shallow and maximally narrow. Juries usually do not offer reasons for
outcomes, and negotiators sometimes conclude that something should happen without
saying why it should happen. I will not emphasize this limiting case here, and shall focus
instead on outcomes accompanied by low-level or mid-level principles.
My emphasis on shallowness in the form of incompletely theorized agreements is
intended partly as descriptive. These agreements are a pervasive phenomenon in
constitution-making and constitutional law. Such agreements are crucial to the effort to
make effective decisions amidst intense disagreement. But I mean to make some points
about constitutionalism amidst pluralism as well. In short, there are real virtues to
avoiding large-scale theoretical conflicts. Incompletely theorized agreements can operate
6

as foundations for both rules and analogies, and such agreements are especially wellsuited to the limits of many diverse institutions, including legislators and courts.
Incompletely theorized agreements have their place in the private sector as well. They
can be found on university faculties, in the workplace, and even within families. At the
same time, there are many problems with incomplete theorization, and I shall spend some
of time on those problems here.
C. Converging on Practices
It seems clear that outside of law, people may agree on a correct outcome even
though they do not have a theory to account for their judgments. You may know that
dropped objects fall, that snow melts, and that hot stoves burn, without knowing exactly
why these facts are true. The same is true for morality, both in general and insofar as it
bears on constitutional law. You may know that slavery and genocide are wrong, that
government may not stop political protests, that every person should have just one vote,
and that it is bad for government to take your land unless it pays for it, without knowing
exactly or entirely why these things are so. Moral judgments may be right or true even if
they are reached by people who lack a full account of those judgments (though moral
reasoners may well do better if they try to offer such an account, a point to which I will
return). The same is true for law, constitutional and otherwise. A judge may know that if
government punishes religious behavior, it has acted unlawfully, without having a full
account of why this principle has been accepted as law. We may thus offer an
epistemological point: People can know that X is true without entirely knowing why X is
true.
Something similar holds for politics and law as well. Sometimes people can agree
on individual judgments even if they disagree on general theory. In American
constitutional law, for example, diverse judges may agree that Roe v. Wade,3 protecting
the right to choose abortion, should not be overruled, though the reasons that lead each of
them to that conclusion sharply diverge. Some people think that the Court should respect
its own precedents; others think that Roe was rightly decided as a way of protecting
women’s equality; others think that the case was rightly decided as a way of protecting
privacy; others think that the decision reflects an appropriate judgment about the social
role of religion; still others think that restrictions on abortion are unlikely to protect
fetuses in the world, and so the decision is good for pragmatic or consequentialist
reasons. We can find incompletely theorized political agreements on particular outcomes
in many areas of law and politics—on both sides of disputes over national security, on
both sides of equality controversies, both sides of disputes over criminal justice, both
sides of disputes over taxation. And in some cases, the incompletely theorized
agreements can obtain assent from both sides.
3410
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D. Hollowness vs. Shallowness
Incompletely theorized agreements play a pervasive role in constitutional law and
in society generally. Return to agreements that are hollow in the sense that people who
accept the principle need not agree on what it entails in particular cases. The agreement is
hollow in the sense that it is incompletely specified. Much of the key work must be done
by others, often through case-by-case judgments, specifying the hollow abstraction at the
point of application. Constitutional provisions usually protect such rights as “freedom of
speech,” “religious liberty,” and “equality under the law,” and citizens agree on those
abstractions in the midst of sharp dispute about what these provisions really entail. Much
lawmaking also becomes possible only because of this phenomenon. And when
agreement on a written constitution is difficult or impossible, it is because it is hard to
obtain consensus on the governing abstractions. Consider the case of Israel, which lacks a
written constitution because citizens have been unable to agree about basic principles,
even if they are pitched at a high level of abstraction.
Observers of democratic constitutionalism might place particular emphasis on a
different kind of phenomenon, of special interest for constitutional law in courts:
incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements
on the shallow principles that account for them. There is no algorithm by which to
distinguish between a high-level theory and one that operates at an intermediate or lower
level. We might consider, as conspicuous examples of high-level theories, Kantianism
and utilitarianism, and see illustrations in the many distinguished (academic) efforts to
understand such areas as tort law, contract law, free speech, and the law of equality as
undergirded by highly abstract theories of the right or the good. By contrast, we might
think of shallow principles as including most of the ordinary material of constitutional
justification or constitutional “doctrine”—the general class of principles and
justifications that courts tend to offer. These principles and justifications are not said to
derive from any particular large theories of the right or the good, have ambiguous
relations to large theories, and are compatible with more than one such theory.
Recall that by the term “shallow principles,” I refer to something relative, not
absolute; I mean to do the same thing with the terms “theories” and “abstractions” (which
I use interchangeably). In this setting, the notions “shallow,” “high,” and “abstract” are
best understood in comparative terms, like the terms “big” and “old” and “unusual.” Thus
the “clear and present danger” standard for regulation of speech in American law is a
relative abstraction when compared with the claim that government may not stop a
terrorist’s speech counseling violence on the Internet, or that members of the Nazi Party
may march in some large city. But the “clear and present danger” idea is relatively
particular when compared with the claim that nations should adopt the constitutional
abstraction “freedom of speech.” The term “freedom of speech” is a relative abstraction
when measured against the claim that campaign finance laws are acceptable, but the same
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term is less abstract than the grounds that justify free speech, as in, for example, the
principle of personal autonomy or the idea of an unrestricted marketplace of ideas.
In analogical reasoning, this phenomenon occurs all the time. In the law of
discrimination, for example, many people think that sex discrimination is “like” race
discrimination, and should be treated similarly, even if they lack or cannot agree on a
general theory of when discrimination is unacceptable. In the law of free speech, many
people agree that a ban on speech by a terrorist or a Communist is “like” a ban on speech
by a member of any opposing party, and should be treated similarly—even if they lack or
cannot agree on a general theory about the foundations of the free speech principle.
III. Defending Small Steps
A. Incomplete Theorization and Silence
What might be said on behalf of incompletely theorized agreements about the
content of a Constitution, or incompletely theorized judgments about particular
constitutional cases? What is so good about shallowness? Some people think of
incomplete theorization as quite unfortunate—as embarrassing, or reflective of some
important problem, or a failure of nerve, or even philistine. When people theorize, by
raising the level of abstraction, they do so to reveal bias, or confusion, or inconsistency.
Surely participants in politics and constitutional law should not abandon this effort.
There is important truth in these usual thoughts, as we shall see below; it would
be senseless to celebrate theoretical modesty at all times and in all contexts. Sometimes
participants in constitutional law and politics have sufficient information, and sufficient
agreement, to be very ambitious. Sometimes they have to reason ambitiously in order to
resolve cases. To the extent that we are able to trust the theoretical capacities of judges,
or others, theoretical ambition seems like nothing to lament. But judges are hardly
infallible, and incompletely theorized judgments help make constitutions and
constitutional law possible. They even help make social life possible. Silence—on
something that may prove false, obtuse, or excessively contentious—can help minimize
conflict, allow the present to learn from the future, and save a great deal of time and
expense. What is said and resolved may be no more important than what is left out. There
are a number of points here.
The first and most obvious point is that incompletely theorized agreements about
constitutional principles and cases may be necessary for social stability. They are wellsuited to a world—and especially a legal world—containing social disagreement on
large-scale issues. Stability would be difficult to obtain if fundamental disagreements
broke out in every case of public or private dispute. In the nations of Eastern Europe,
stable constitution-making has been possible only because the meaning of the document’s
broad terms has not been specified in advance.
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Second, incompletely theorized agreements can promote two goals of a
constitutional democracy and a liberal legal system: to enable people to live together, and
to permit them to show each other a measure of reciprocity and mutual respect. The use
of low-level principles or rules allows judges on multimember bodies and perhaps even
citizens generally to find a common way of life without producing unnecessary
antagonism. Both rules and low-level principles make it unnecessary to resolve
fundamental disagreements. At the same time, incompletely theorized agreements allow
people to show each other a high degree of mutual respect, civility, reciprocity, or even
charity. Frequently ordinary people disagree in some deep way on an issue—what to do
in the Middle East, pornography, same-sex marriages, the war on terror—and sometimes
they agree not to discuss that issue much, as a way of deferring to each other’s strong
convictions and showing a measure of reciprocity and respect (even if they do not at all
respect the particular conviction that is at stake). If reciprocity and mutual respect are
desirable, it follows that public officials or judges, perhaps even more than ordinary
people, should not challenge their fellow citizens’ deepest and most defining
commitments, at least if those commitments are reasonable and if there is no need for
them to do so. Indeed, we can see a kind of political charity in the refusal to contest those
commitments when life can proceed without any such contest.
To be sure, some fundamental commitments are appropriately challenged in the
legal system or within other multimember bodies. Some such commitments are ruled offlimits by the Constitution itself. Many provisions involving basic rights have this
function. Of course it is not always disrespectful to disagree with someone in a
fundamental way; on the contrary, such disagreements may sometimes reflect profound
respect. When defining commitments are based on demonstrable errors of fact or logic, it
is appropriate to contest them. So too when those commitments are rooted in a rejection
of the basic dignity of all human beings, or when it is necessary to undertake the contest
to resolve a genuine problem. But many cases can be resolved in an incompletely
theorized way, and this is the ordinary stuff of constitutional law; that is what I am
emphasizing here.
The third point is that for arbiters of social controversies, incompletely theorized
agreements have the crucial function of reducing the political cost of enduring
disagreements. If participants in constitutional law disavow large-scale theories, then
losers in particular cases lose much less. They lose a decision, but not the world. They
may win on another occasion. Their own theory has not been rejected or ruled
inadmissible. When the authoritative rationale for the result is disconnected from abstract
theories of the good or the right, the losers can submit to legal obligations, even if
reluctantly, without being forced to renounce their largest ideals.
Fourth, incompletely theorized agreements are especially valuable when a society
seeks moral evolution and progress over time. Consider the area of equality, where
considerable change has occurred in the past and will inevitably occur in the future. A
completely theorized judgment would be unable to accommodate changes in facts or
10

values. If a culture really did attain a theoretical end-state, it would become rigid and
calcified; we would know what we thought about everything. Unless the complete
theorization were error-free, this would disserve posterity. Hence incompletely theorized
agreements are a key to debates over equality in both law and politics, with issues being
raised about whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, age, disability, and
others are analogous to discrimination on the basis of race; such agreements have the
important advantage of allowing a large degree of openness to new facts and
perspectives.
At one point, we might think that same-sex relations are akin to incest; at another
point, we might find the analogy bizarre. Of course a completely theorized judgment
would have many virtues if it is correct. But at any particular moment in time, this is an
unlikely prospect for human beings, not excluding judges in constitutional disputes, or
those entrusted with the task of creating constitutional provisions.
Compare practical reasoning in ordinary life. At a certain time, you may well
refuse to make decisions that seem foundational in character—about, for example,
whether to get married within the next year, or whether to have two, three, or four
children, or whether to live in London or Paris. Part of the reason for this refusal is
knowledge that your understandings of both facts and values may well change. Indeed,
your identity may itself change in important and relevant ways, and for this reason a set
of firm commitments in advance—something like a fully theorized conception of your
life course—would make no sense. Legal systems and nations are not altogether
different. I will turn shortly to the limitations of these arguments.
Fifth, shallow rulings seem well-suited to the institutional limits of the federal
judiciary, which might well blunder if it tries for theoretical depth. Recall that
shallowness can reduce the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. If judges were
infallible, and if they had immediate access to the correct theory, there would be little
reason to object to depth. But if judges do not think easily or well about theoretical
questions, they might avoid depth as a way of minimizing their own burdens while
reducing errors.
I am not attempting to defend shallowness in all circumstances. We will soon see
that much can be wrong with it. The point is that for a series of reasons, many of them
pragmatic, shallowness might be chosen by sensible judges.
B. Burke and His Rationalist Adversaries
Those who emphasize incompletely theorized agreements owe an evident debt to
Edmund Burke, who was, in a sense, the great theorist of incomplete theorization. I do
not attempt anything like an exegesis of Burke, an exceedingly complex figure, in this
space, but let us turn briefly to Burke himself and in particular to his great essay on the
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French Revolution, in which he rejected the revolutionary temperament because of its
theoretical ambition.4
Burke’s key claim is that the “science of constructing a commonwealth, or
reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori.”5 To
make this argument, Burke opposes theories and abstractions, developed by individual
minds, to traditions, built up by many minds over long periods. In his most vivid passage,
Burke writes:
“The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for
such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience
than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be,
it is with infinite caution than any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice
which has answered in any tolerable degree, for ages the common purposes of society, or
on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his
eyes.”6
It is for this reason that Burke describes the “spirit of innovation” as “the result of
a selfish temper and confined views,”7 and offers the term “prejudice” as one of
enthusiastic approval, noting that “instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we
cherish them to a very considerable degree.”8 Emphasizing the critical importance of
stability, Burke adds a reference to “the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand
times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice.”9 Burke’s sharpest
distinction, then, is between established practices and individual reason. He contends that
reasonable citizens, aware of their own limitations, will effectively delegate decisionmaking authority to their own traditions. “We are afraid to put men to live and trade each
on his own private stock of reason,” simply “because we suspect that this stock in each
man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general
bank and capital of nations, and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of
exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which
prevails in them.”10
Burke was enthusiastic about reasoning by analogy, and it is easy to imagine an
unambivalently Burkean advocate of incompletely theorized agreements. But Burke’s
enthusiasm for traditions is contentious, and for good reason. In the aftermath of
apartheid, should South Africa have built carefully, and in a tradition-bound way, on its
own past? Or should it have adopted a constitution on the basis of some kind of account
of human liberty and equality? Social practices, and constitution-making, can be
4 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 416-451 (Isaac
Kramnick ed. 1999).
5 Id. at 442.
6 Id. at 451.
7 Id. at 428.
8 Id. at 451.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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incompletely theorized while also being anti-Burkean. The South African Constitution
itself includes stirring and tradition-rejecting ideals of various kinds, and those ideals can
be accepted from many different foundations. In constitutional adjudication, judges who
believe in incompletely theorized agreements might require government to come up with
a reason for its practice—and insist that a tradition, or a longstanding practice, is not
itself a reason.
In constitutional law, we can imagine fierce contests between Burkeans and their
more rationalist adversaries, even if both camps are willing to march under the banner of
incomplete theorization.11 Those contests cannot be resolved in the abstract; everything
depends on the nature of the relevant traditions and the competence of those who propose
to subject them to critical scrutiny. If traditions are good, and if the scrutinizers are bad,
traditionalism is appealing. If the traditions include injustice and cruelty, and if the
scrutinizers are reliable, then traditionalism makes no sense. We shall shortly see how
these points bear on theoretical ambition in constitutional law.
C. Narrowness
Now let us turn to narrowness, which is simpler to handle. In some domains of
constitutional law, it is certainly best to focus on the particulars and to avoid width. A
court might sensibly rule that one exercise of presidential power is unconstitutional,
without saying much about other imaginable exercises of presidential power. A court
might sensibly rule that sex segregation is impermissible in one domain, without saying
much about whether sex segregation might be impermissible in other domains. A court
might strike one restriction on speech on the Internet, while also refusing to lay down
broad rules governing restrictions of speech on the Internet. A court might strike down
one restriction on gun ownership under the Second Amendment, while leaving a great
deal undecided about the ultimate meaning of that amendment. Recall here Chief Justice
Roberts’ plea for narrowness and his suggestion that if it is not necessary for a court to
say more to decide a case, it is necessary for a court not to say more to decide a case.
But is Chief Justice Roberts correct? Why would sensible judges embrace
narrowness? Why, exactly, is it necessary not to say more to decide a case, if it is not
necessary to say more to decide a case? We can isolate several reasons. First, institutional
reality may require it. On a multimember court, consisting of several (strong-willed?)
people, it might be possible to reach a consensus on a particular outcome, but not on a
wide rule. Second, wide rulings might impose serious decisional burdens on judges, even
if the institutional problem could be overcome. To issue a wide ruling that covers sex
segregation, or speech on the Internet, may require judges to ask and answer questions
for which they lack relevant information. Third, wide rulings might turn out to embarrass
the future. To the extent that courts are in a poor position to generate rules that fit diverse
situations, their efforts to do so might produce serious blunders.
11

For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006).
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These are (yet again) points about the costs of decisions and the costs of errors.
But there is an additional point, involving democratic self-government. In the
constitutional domain, narrow rules preserve a great deal of space for continuing
discussion and debate. Imagine, for example, that a court is asked to issue some wide
ruling involving the rights of gays and lesbians or the authority of the President. A refusal
to issue that ruling, and a narrow ruling focused on particulars, allows room for
continuing argument in the democratic domain. To be sure, a judicial decision that
refuses to impose constitutional constraints, and that says (for example) that governments
can discriminate against gays and lesbians as they choose, allows democratic space by
definition. But in many nations, arguments about morality, and about what government
legitimately does, take place in the domain of constitutional argument. In many ways, it
is desirable if leaders and citizens generally are permitted to offer their competing views
about the meaning of the Constitution itself. For this reason, narrowness can claim
democratic justifications.
IV. Against Minimalism
A. Beyond Narrowness
To see what might be wrong with minimalism, let us notice that the points just
offered are subject to reasonable objections. In many contexts, they fail to provide an
adequate justification of narrowness.
Suppose that a court is operating in a domain where predictability is extremely
important—as, for example, because the issue comes up often, because people need
guidance, and because it is simply too messy to have to proceed without a sense of what
the law is. If this is so, narrow rulings will impose significant decisionmaking burdens on
others—and very possibly increase decision costs on balance. Imagine, for example, that
the question is the appropriate scope of review of judicial review of agency
interpretations of law. That question arises with great frequency, and if a high court does
not issue a wide ruling, then lower courts will have to handle a lot of uncertainty. If an
area of law is a mess, because of a series of narrow rulings, posterity might be harmed
rather than helped.
We can see here a serious problem with Chief Justice Roberts’ embrace of
unanimous rulings. Roberts favors such rulings in part on the ground that they promote
predictability. If the court is not fractured, everyone will know what the law is. But as
Roberts also contends, a unanimous ruling is more likely to be narrow, simply because a
wide ruling is unlikely to be able to attract a consensus. The problem is that a unanimous,
narrow ruling might offer significantly less guidance than a divided, wide ruling. From
the standpoint of promoting predictability, it is better, perhaps, to have a 7-2 ruling in
favor of some general proposition than a 9-0 ruling in favor of some narrow proposition,
limited to particular facts.
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It is possible in this light to appreciate certain movements toward width in
constitutional law. After decades of grappling with the question of when, exactly, a
confession can be said to be voluntary, the Supreme Court issued its wide ruling in the
Miranda case—essentially requiring a set of warnings to precede any interrogation.12 An
explanation of this unusually wide step is that the task of deciding on the voluntariness of
confessions, on a case-by-case basis, was simply too confusing and difficult. In the
interest of clarity and predictability, a wide rule seemed best. Or consider the question
whether and when a sexually explicit film should be regulable as “obscenity.” After
decades of administering a test that invited difficult case-by-case inquiries, the Court
adopted for an approach that included greater clarity and width.13 A defense of that
approach is that it greatly reduced decisional burdens, in a way that was justified in light
of a) the Court’s considerable experience with the problem and b) the frequency with
which the issue had arisen.
As a third example, consider the problem of school segregation. For decades, the
Court investigated, on a case-by-case basis, the question whether “separate” really was
“equal.” In ruling that separate was inherently unequal,14 the Court adopted a general
principle about equality, with a degree of theoretical depth to be sure (and I will have
something to say about that in a moment). But the Court also issued a wide rule, one that
ensured a simple, clear answer to a question that had been pressed repeatedly and been
answered only with difficulty.
B. Narrowness and Width, Standards and Rules
We should now be able to see that the choice between narrowness and width
raises many of the questions raised by the choice between standards and rules, a topic
that has produced a large literature.15 A standard leads a great deal of work to be done by
subsequent decision-makers; by contrast, a rule resolves cases in advance, and ensures
that the work of subsequent decision-makers is essentially mechanical. For example, a 60
mile per hour speech limit is a rule, whereas a standard might say that a driver must drive
in a “reasonable and prudent manner.” Under the specified speech limit, it is obvious
whether someone has violated the law; under a standard, the judge has to do a fair bit of
work to decide that question.
A preference for minimalism is very close, analytically, to a preference for
standards over rules. To be sure, the two preferences are not identical. A holding that is
governed by a standard is in an important respect narrow, because the standard needs to
be specified in particular cases; but a narrow decision need not be a standard at all. Such
a decision may even be a rule, restricted to an unusual set of facts; it may not set out a
standard of any kind. What I am emphasizing is that by its very nature, a minimalist
12
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ruling leaves a great deal undecided, in a way that frees up future decision-makers but
also leaves them to some extent at sea. This is exactly the characteristic that distinguishes
standards from rules.
A preference for standards makes best sense when it serves to reduce the number
and magnitude of errors, and when it serves as well to reduce the aggregate burdens of
decision. Suppose again that the Supreme Court is attempting to resolve a difficult
question involving, say, the constitutional status of segregation on the basis of sex. The
Court might think that it lacks the information that would enable it to set out a sensible
rule. It may believe that sex segregation is not acceptable when it excludes women from a
valuable educational opportunity, but that it is permissible to have sex-segregated sports
teams, and that the legitimacy of sex-segregated high school education presents difficult
question. The Court might believe that a simple rule—sex segregation yes, or sex
segregation no—would be outrun by reality. It might also believe that a complex rule,
specifying the validity of segregation across diverse contexts, is too difficult to specify
during an early encounter with the question.16
Points of this kind do justify a preference for narrow rulings in many contexts.
The problem—the general one for those who favor narrowness—is that there is no reason
to think that judges should systematically favor standards over rules. Whether standards
are desirable, and whether narrowness makes sense, depend on whether the arguments
that justify them apply in the particular case. There is no justification for a general
presumption in favor of standards or narrowness. The pragmatic arguments that justify
narrowness will often call for its repudiation. I am suggesting, then, that it is often
sensible for judges to go beyond minimalism in the form of narrowness, because the
pragmatic and democratic arguments that (sometimes) call for small steps often argue
strongly in favor of large ones. If judges are concerned with the costs of decisions and the
costs of errors, they will often find themselves settling on wide rules.
Let us return to the question of shallowness in this light.
C. Conceptual Ascents: From Shallowness to Depth
Borrowing from Henry Sidgwick’s writings on ethical method,17 a critic of
shallowness, in the form of incompletely theorized agreements, might respond that
constitutional law should frequently use ambitious theories.18 For example, there is often
good reason for people interested in constitutional rights to raise the level of abstraction
and ultimately to resort to large-scale theory. Concrete judgments about particular cases
can prove inadequate for morality or constitutional law. Sometimes people do not have
clear intuitions about how cases should come out. Sometimes their intuitions are
15
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insufficiently reflective. Sometimes seemingly similar cases provoke different reactions,
and it is necessary to raise the level of theoretical ambition to explain whether those
different reactions are justified, or to show that the seemingly similar cases are different
after all. Sometimes people simply disagree.
By looking at broader principles, we may be able to mediate the disagreement. In
any case there is a problem of explaining our considered judgments about particular
cases, in order to see whether they are not just a product of accident or error. When
modest judges joins an opinion that is incompletely theorized, they must rely on a reason
or a principle, justifying one outcome rather than another. The opinion must itself refer to
a reason or principle; it cannot just announce a victor. Perhaps the low-level principle is
wrong, because it fails to fit with other cases, or because it is not defensible as a matter of
(legally relevant) political morality.
Here is another way to put the point. Sometimes it is burdensome to rule in a
theoretically ambitious way, and sometimes shallow decisions can be wrong. A judge
who thinks more ambitiously—about, for example, affirmative action, abortion, and
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—might be able to produce safeguards
against blunders. In the abstract, the incompletely theorized agreement may be nothing to
celebrate. If a judge is reasoning well, he should have before him a range of other cases,
C through Z, in which the principle is tested against others and refined. At least if he is a
distinguished judge, he will experience a kind of “conceptual ascent,” in which the more
or less isolated and small low-level principle is finally made part of a more general
theory. Perhaps this would be a paralyzing task, and perhaps our judge need not often
attempt it. But it is an appropriate model for understanding law and an appropriate
aspiration for evaluating judicial and political outcomes. Judges who insist on staying at a
low level of theoretical ambition are philistines, even ostriches.
Return to ordinary life. If someone is unsure what to do with a relationship or a
medical problem, he might not do so well if he avoids the foundational questions. If he
can answer those questions well, he might be able to choose far more wisely than he will
do if he plods along with decisions that are at once narrow and shallow. Something
similar seems to be true in the constitutional domain. Indeed, we might go beyond
necessity and speak instead of opportunity. Perhaps it is best to see constitutional
provisions as positively inviting a degree of depth, and therefore to celebrate those
occasions in which courts announce the nature of the foundational commitments that
underlie one or another right. In the domain of equality, the ban on racial segregation is
not properly taken as a tribute to the importance of predictability. Instead the Court
deepened the foundations of the equality norm, essentially seeing it as a ban on
government efforts to subordinate an identifiable group. In the domain of sex equality,
the Supreme Court has issued a narrow ruling that also offers a degree of depth, because
it opts for a particular conception of what the equality principle is about.
At least if they have time and competence, moral and constitutional reasoners
thinking about basic rights should be encouraged to attempt a degree of theoretical
17

ambition. In democratic processes, it is appropriate and sometimes indispensable to
challenge existing practice in abstract terms. The same is true in constitutional law. And
while narrow rulings leave posterity less constrained, the absence of constraint may be a
vice, rather than a virtue, if the result is to leave nearly everything up for grabs.
As I have noted, minimalist decisions have many virtues. They might reflect the
institutional limits of the judiciary; they can reduce the social costs of disagreement; they
seem to demonstrate humility and mutual respect. Both narrowness and shallowness may
be critical to successful constitution-making in a pluralistic society. The points bear on
constitutional disputes as well. In a well-functioning constitutional democracy, judges are
usually reluctant to invoke philosophical abstractions as a basis for invalidating the
outcomes of electoral processes. They are reluctant because they know that they may
misunderstand the relevant philosophical arguments, and they seek to show respect to the
diverse citizens in their nation. A conceptual ascent might be appealing in the abstract,
but if those who ascend will blunder, they might stay close to the ground. But as judicial
confidence grows, perhaps because of extended experience, the argument for depth grows
as well.
I have emphasized theoretical ambition on moral questions, but notice that an
interest in depth might push judges to accept a contentious approach that, in particular
cases, diminishes their own theory-building obligations. Perhaps judges can be
convinced, in one or another domain, that they should not invalidate statutes unless the
constitutional violation is clear and unmistakable.19 This position is certainly
controversial, and some of the arguments on its behalf have a degree of theoretical
ambition. But if judges accept it, they will not be required to think ambitiously very
often. Or consider originalism. Those who argue that judges should be bound by the
original meaning often contend that their approach disciplines courts and relieves them
from the task of making their own judgments about the nature of liberty or equality.20 To
be sure, we could imagine an incompletely theorized agreement on behalf of originalism,
but it seems clear that people will not accept that approach unless they can be persuaded
to agree on some foundational questions.
The central point is that methodological disputes are often central to
constitutional law. If one or another method is best, and if judges have reason to believe
that it is best, they should accept it. Shallowness, on questions of method, may not be
possible in the face of dispute, and even if shallowness is possible, it might lead to
serious blunders.

D. Fundamentals
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Incompletely theorized agreements have many virtues, but the arguments on their
behalf cannot be accepted in the abstract. Stability, for example, is brought about by such
agreements, and stability is usually desirable; but a constitutional system that is stable
and unjust should probably be made less stable. Consider two qualifications to what has
been said thus far. Some cases cannot be decided at all without introducing a fair amount
in the way of theory. Some constitutional cases cannot be decided well without
introducing more ambitious theory. If a good theory (involving, for example, the right to
free speech) is available, and if judges can be persuaded that the theory is good, there
should be no taboo on its judicial acceptance.
What of disagreement? The discussion thus far has focused on the value of
convergence. In law, as in politics, disagreement can be a productive and creative force,
revealing error, showing gaps, moving discussion and results in better directions. Many
constitutional orders place a high premium on “government by discussion,” and when the
process is working well, this is true for the judiciary as well as for other institutions.
Existing agreements may be a product of coercion, subtle or not, or of accidents of
various kinds, or of a failure of imagination.
Constitutional disagreements have many legitimate sources. Two of these
sources are especially important. First, people may share general commitments but
disagree on particular outcomes. Second, people’s disagreements on general principles
may produce disagreement over particular outcomes and low-level propositions as well.
People who think that an autonomy principle accounts for freedom of speech may also
think that the government cannot regulate truthful, nondeceptive commercial
advertising—whereas people who think that freedom of speech is basically a democratic
idea, and is focused on political speech, may have no interest in protecting commercial
advertising at all. Constitutional theorizing can have a salutary function in part because it
tests low-level principles by reference to more ambitious claims. Disagreements can be
productive by virtue of this process of testing.
Certainly if everyone having a reasonable general view converges on a
particular (by hypothesis reasonable) judgment, nothing is amiss. But if an agreement is
incompletely theorized, there is a risk that everyone who participates in the agreement is
mistaken, and hence that the outcome is mistaken. There is also a risk that someone who
is reasonable has not participated, and that if that person were included, the agreement
would break down. Over time, incompletely theorized agreements should be subject to
scrutiny and critique, at least in democratic arenas, and sometimes in courtrooms as well.
That process may result in more ambitious thinking than constitutional law ordinarily
entails.
Social consensus is hardly a consideration that outweighs everything else.
Usually it would be much better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an
unjust outcome with which all or most agree. A just constitution is more important than
an agreed-upon constitution. Consensus or agreement is important largely because of its
connection with stability, itself a valuable but far from overriding social goal. It may well
19

be right to make an unjust constitutional order a lot less stable. We have seen that
incompletely theorized agreements, even if stable and broadly supported, may conceal or
reflect injustice. Certainly agreements should be more fully theorized when the relevant
theory is plainly right and people can be shown that it is right, or when the invocation of
the theory is necessary to decide cases. None of this is inconsistent with what I have
claimed here.
It would be foolish to say that no general theory about constitutional law or
rights can obtain agreement, even more foolish to deny that some general theories
deserve support, and most foolish of all to say that incompletely theorized agreements
warrant respect whatever their content. Shallowness, no less than narrowness, has
pragmatic justifications, and in some cases, those justifications will often prove
inadequate. It is true that more ambitious decisions create real losers, who will not be
pleased to find that their defining commitments have been ruled off-limits. But
sometimes the losers deserve to lose. Consider, for example, the width and relative depth
reflected in judicial rulings that racial segregation is unconstitutional, that government
may not take stands in favor of particular religions, that the president does not have the
inherent authority to seize private property, that political speech may not be regulated
unless it presents a clear and present danger, that the first amendment sharply restricts
use of the common law of libel, and that the equality principle prevents governments
from turning the sex difference into a systematic source of social disadvantage.
For good reasons, judgments of this kind are rare. But in the most glorious
periods in democratic life, national decisions reflect a high degree of theoretical depth,
and they are wide rather than narrow. In crucial moments in American history, the same
has been true of constitutional law. Many of those moments deserve celebration, not
lament.21
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